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United States v. Salerno: Pretrial Detention Seen

Through the Looking Glass
Frightened and frustrated by spiraling crime rates, our nation's leaders
have sought ways in the 1980s to address increased public demand for more
effective law enforcement and greater public safety. Their efforts have involved
weighing and balancing two conflicting policy concerns: the need to protect
communities against crime and the constitutional rights of the accused. In the
clamor for politically popular positions and short-term solutions, the former interest can overshadow the latter. A classic children's tale exemplifies the current
danger:
The Queen observes that the King's Messenger is "in prison now, being punished; and the trial doesn't even begin till next Wednesday; and
of course the crime comes last of all." Perplexed, Alice asks, "Suppose
he never commits the crime?" "That would be all the better, wouldn't
it?" the Queen replies. 1
Although imprisoning someone before his trial may seem to be as bizarre as
Alice's adventures through the looking glass, this same sequence results whenever a court denies a defendant bail because of crimes he may commit if he were
released. In United States v. Salerno2 the United States Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act of 1984,3 which allows magistrates
to order pretrial detention of accused criminal defendants without bail. The
Court held, for the first time, that the eighth amendment does not prohibit legislatures from denying a defendant bail to ensure the safety of the community. 4
According to the Court, pretrial detention does not violate the defendant's due
process rights so long as the detainment is not technically "punishment," 5 and
the state has a "compelling interest" in detaining the defendant. 6
This Note examines the historical background of pretrial detention and the
debate over whether the eighth amendment ensures a constitutional right to bail
before trial. It discusses the Bail Reform Act, its purpose, and its provisions
outlining when and how accused defendants are to be detained before trial. It
also analyzes the Supreme Court's reasoning in Salerno in holding that the Bail
Reform Act is not unconstitutional. The Note concludes that the Court did not
adequately consider the legal tradition in America of a defendant's right to bail
nor the punitive nature of pretrial detention. It also points out some of the
dangers of this diminished regard for the rights of the accused.
1. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L.
REV. 371, 374-75 (1970) (quoting L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 75 (1902)).
2. 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987).
3. Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3141-3156 (Supp. 1985)).
4. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2104-05.
5. Id. at 2101-02.
6. Id. at 2102-03.
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On March 21, 1986, Anthony "Fat Tony" Salerno and Vincent "Fish"
Cafaro were arrested along with thirteen others in a much publicized crackdown
on organized crime in the New York metropolitan area. Defendants were
charged in a twenty-nine-count indictment alleging various Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, 7 mail and wire fraud
offenses, s extortion, 9 and criminal gambling violations. 10 The RICO counts alleged thirty-five specific acts of racketeering activity, which included fraud, extortion, gambling, and two conspiracies to commit murder.I 1 At their
arraignment, the Government moved to have Salerno and Cafaro detained
before trial "on the ground that no condition of release would assure the safety
12
of the community or any person."'

At the required detention hearing,'

fer of evidence

14

3

the Government made a detailed prof-

showing "that Salerno was the boss of the Genovese Crime

Family of La Cosa Nostra, and that Cafaro was a captain in the Genovese Fam-

ily.'

15

The proffer also indicated two of the Government's trial witnesses would

6
testify that Salerno had participated personally in two murder conspiracies.'
7
Despite defendants' opposition to the motion,' the district court ordered after a
two-day hearing that Salerno and Cafaro be committed to the custody of the
Attorney General for confinement prior to trial.18

7. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)-(d) (1982).
8. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982).
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982).
10. See 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1982).
11. United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 66 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987).
12. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2099 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. 1985)).
13. The Bail Reform Act requires a hearing before a criminal defendant can be detained without bail before trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (Supp. 1985); see infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
14. The Act states that formal rules on admissibility of evidence in criminal trials do not apply
at pretrial detention hearings. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (Supp. 1985); see infra note 93. Therefore, hearsay evidence can be admitted. See FED. R. EvID. 801-806.
15. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2099.
16. Salerno, 794 F.2d at 66-67. The testimony showed that Salerno "'could order a murder
merely by voicing his assent with the single word "hit."' ". Id. at 67 (quoting United States v.
Salerno, 631 F. Supp. 1364, 1371 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated and remanded, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986),
rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987)).
17. Salerno questioned the credibility of the Government's key witnesses, who formerly had
been high-ranking members of organized crime, because of their criminal pasts and their favorable
cooperation agreements with the Government. Id. He also proferred the testimony of witnesses
who would state they did not consider Salerno to be any danger to the community and produced a
letter from his doctor describing his serious health problems. Id. Cafaro presented no evidence at
the hearing but did argue that the Government's tape recordings of his threats of violence were
nothing more than "tough talk." Id.
18. Salerno, 631 F. Supp. 1364, 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The district court concluded the Government had established by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions of release would ensure the safety of the community or any person in the community:
The activities of a criminal organization such as the Genovese Family do not cease
with the arrest of its principals and their release on even the most stringent of bail conditions. The illegal businesses, in place for many years, require constant attention and protection, or they will fail. Under these circumstances, this court recognizes a strong
incentive on the part of its leadership to continue business as usual. When business as
usual involves threats, beatings, and murder, the present danger such people pose to the
community is self-evident.
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Salerno and Cafaro appealed the pretrial detention order to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Their primary argument was
that the Bail Reform Act of 1984, by permitting pretrial detention on the ground
the arrestee is likely to commit future crimes, violated the due process clause
and was, therefore, unconstitutional on its face. 19 Relying on its decision in
United States v. Melendez-Carrion,20 the court of appeals agreed with Salerno
and Cafaro, vacated the order of the district court, and remanded the case for
setting conditions of bail. 21 In Melendez-Carrion, the Second Circuit held that
"the total deprivation of liberty as a means of preventing future crime exceeds
the substantive limitations of the Due Process Clause."'22 Stating that the use of
pretrial detention to prevent crime "'conflicts with fundamental principles of
our constitutional system of criminal justice,'" the court of appeals in Salerno
distinguished the denial of bail to prevent flight, because the latter use of pretrial
detention " 'serves the principles of that system by guaranteeing that the defendant will stand trial and, if convicted, face punishment.' "23 In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Feinberg noted that the other circuit courts considering the
issue had held the Bail Reform Act constitutional on its face. 24 The Chief Justice argued the statute required that pretrial detention be used sparingly and
only as a remedy of last resort 25 and provided adequate safeguards to protect
26
defendants' rights of due process.
The United States Supreme Court granted the Government's petition for a
writ of certiorari 27 and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. 28 Writing
for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed separately whether the Bail
Reform Act violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment 29 or the
excessive bail clause of the eighth amendment.3 0 The Court held that it violated
neither: "In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception. We hold that the provisions for pretrial detention in the Bail Reform Act of 1984 fall within that carefully limited
31
exception."1
In addressing defendants' due process claims, the Court first found that
19. Salerno, 794 F.2d at 68.
20. 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986) (18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) held unconstitutional as specifically applied to defendant's eight-month pretrial detention because of his alleged danger to the community).
21. Salerno, 794 F.2d at 66.
22. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 1001.
23. Salerno, 794 F.2d at 73-74 (quoting Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 1002).
24. Id. at 76 (Feinberg, C.J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758 (7th Cir.
1986); United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1986)).
25. Id. at 76"(Feinberg, C.J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 77-78 (Feinberg, C.J., dissenting).
27. United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. 397 (1986).
28. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2105.
29. The due process clause provides in part, "No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment applies
the right to due process to state action by providing that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
30. The eighth amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required ....
" U.S. CONST.
amend VIII.
31. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2105.
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pretrial detention is a permissible regulation of conduct rather than punishment. 32 To reach this conclusion, the Court examined " 'whether an alternative
purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for
it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it].' ",33 The alternative purpose in this case was the government's
interest in preventing crime, which the Court described as "both legitimate and
compelling."'3 4 The next step in the Court's reasoning was to weigh the government's interest against the "individual's strong interest in liberty."' 35 After considering the procedural safeguards of the detention hearing, 36 the Court
concluded that the regulatory purpose of the Bail Reform Act outweighed the
liberty interest of the persons affected. Consequently, the Act was not facially
37
invalid under the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
In holding that the Bail Reform Act did not violate the excessive bail clause
of the eighth amendment, the Court reasoned that the clause restrains judicial
action only when bail is available and does not prohibit a legislature from denying bail completely in appropriate instances. 38 According to the Court's reasoning, the only possible substantive limitation of the bail clause is that the
Government's proposed conditions of release or detention are not "excessive"
when compared to the interests protected by those conditions. 39 Under this
analysis, the Court held that the pretrial detention provisions of the Bail Reform
Act are not excessive. Relying on Carlson v. Landon,4° the Salerno Court stated
that "we reject the proposition that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the government from pursuing other admittedly compelling interests
through regulation of pretrial release." 4 1 Although the Court had stated in
Stack v. Boyle 42 that bail could not be set at a figure higher than an amount
reasonably calculated to ensure the defendant's presence at trial, 4 3 the Salerno
Court distinguished this dicta in Stack on the ground that the Stack Court did
not consider whether the excessive bail clause required courts to admit all defendants to bail. 44
In a vehement dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, argued
that these issues should not be divided into independent due process and exces32. Id. at 2101.
33. Id. (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984)).
34. Id. at 2102.
35. Id. at 2103.
36. Id. at 2103-04; see infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
37. Id. at 2104.
38. See id. at 2103-04. The Court stated that "[t]his Clause, of course, says nothing about
whether bail shall be available at all." Id. at 2103.
39. Id. at 2105.
40. 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (bail denied pending a determination of deportability of a resident
alien); see Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2104-05 (discussing Carlson).
41. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2104.

42. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
43. Id. at 5.
44. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2104. In Stack, the statute before the Court, Alien Registration
(Smith) Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940), did not prohibit releasing accused defendants on bail. See
Stack, 342 U.S. at 3.
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sive bail arguments.4 5 Instead, he stated that the central issue in the case, to

which the majority did not refer, was defendant's presumption of innocence
prior to trial as protected by the due process clause. 46 If a court cannot detain a
defendant after his acquittal because of crimes he may someday commit, then it
should not be able to detain him before his trial for that reason. 47 Justice Marshall also argued that the eighth amendment's excessive bail clause should be a

restriction on the legislature as well as the judiciary, because either could deny
the defendant's due process rights by denying his right to bail.48 Although he

agreed that the Bail Reform Act was unconstitutional, Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, added that if the evidence of imminent danger is strong enough, the

government's interest in protecting the safety of the community may at times

49
justify a brief pretrial detention of a defendant.

The historical context for the debate over pretrial detention predates the
ratification of the United States Constitution. In the colonial period, Pennsylvania had provided for a right to bail in criminal cases. 50 In its first session,
Congress established a right to bail in noncapital cases in the federal courts in
the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789.51 However, the key issues raised in Salerno
were whether the excessive bail clause of the eighth amendment guarantees a

constitutional right to bail and, if so, the scope of that right. There is little
historical record on these issues, and the Supreme Court had never directly addressed a general constitutional right to bail before Salerno.5 2 Lower courts
45. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2107 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 2109 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 2110 (Marshall, J., dissenting). According to Marshall, "[O]ur fundamental principles of justice declare that the defendant is as innocent on the day before his trial as he is on the
morning after his acquittal," id. at 2110 (Marshall, J., dissenting), and any infringement of that
presumption of innocence is a violation of the due process and excessive bail clauses, id. at 2110-11
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 2108-09 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 2112 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Both dissents also argued that the Court should not
have reached the merits of these issues because there was no longer a live controversy between the
parties. Before this appeal was heard, Salerno had been sentenced to imprisonment for one hundred
years on charges unrelated to those alleged in this case, but the district court judge in the prior case
had not executed the judgment and commitment order. Despite the pretrial detention order, Cafaro
had been released on bail, ostensibly for medical treatment, so that he could work as a government
informant. Id., at 2106-07 & nn. 1-3 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2113 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (no need to reach merits).
50. The Pennsylvania Frame of Government in 1682, for example, has been quoted as providing that "'all prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses, where the
proof is evident, or the presumption great.' " Alschuler, PreventivePretrialDetention andthe Failure
ofInterest-BalancingApproaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 555 (1986) (quoting PENNSYLVANIA FRAME OF GOVERNMENT art. XI

(1682)).

51. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91.
52. See Alschuler, supra note 50, at 548; Comment, Preventive Detention and United States v.
Edwards: Burdening the Innocent, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 191, 196-97 nn.50-51 (1982). As a result of
this lack of evidence of the framers' original intent on a constitutional right to bail, this has been an
area of vigorous scholarly debate. CompareDuker, The Right to Bail: A HistoricalInquiry, 42 ALB.
L. REV. 33, 83-86 (1977) (arguing the framers did not intend to provide for a right to bail) and
Meyer, ConstitutionalityofPretrialDetention (pt. 1), 60 GEo. L.J. 1139, 1190-94 (1972) (same) with
Foote, The Coming ConstitutionalCrisisin Bail (pt. 1), 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 972 (1965) ("There
is.. . no evidence in the concurrent consideration of the Bill of Rights and Judiciary Act of any
deliberate congressional intention to exclude a right to bail under what became the eighth amendment."). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals conducted a thorough survey of these historical
arguments in United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1326-31 (D.C. 1981) (en banc) (excessive
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finding a constitutional right to bail have usually relied on the same dicta from
Stack 53 that was cited by defendants in Salerno: "[Flederal law has unequivocally provided that a person arrested for a non-capital offense shall be admitted
to bail.... Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of
'54
innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning."
On the other hand, when courts have denied the right to bail, they have been
able to cite opposing dicta in Carlson55 for the proposition that the eighth
56

amendment does not prevent Congress from defining nonbailable offenses.

Even when statutes have provided for a right to bail, this right has not been

absolute. Historically, courts have denied bail both when the defendant was
accused of committing a capital crime and when the defendant threatened pro-

spective witnesses or jurors. In the former instance, courts have reasoned that
no amount of bail would adequately ensure a defendant's presence at a trial

when his life was at stake.5 7 Generally, an arrestee may be detained until trial if
he presents a risk of flight.58 In the latter case, courts have exercised their au-

thority to protect the safety of witnesses and jurors so that they would participate in the trial, 59 thus preserving the court's power to safeguard the integrity of
6°

the judicial process.
In other circumstances the Supreme Court has upheld the denial of bail.
The cases can roughly be placed into three categories. First, persons whom the

government believes dangerous can be detained in times of war or insurrecbail clause does not prevent Congress from defining nonbailable offenses), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022
(1982). See Comment, supra, at 196-99.
53. 342 U.S. 1 (1951). The Court in Stack held that the bail set for defendants accused of
violating the Smith Act was excessive under the eighth amendment, and remanded the case for a
new bail proceeding. Id. at 6-7.
54. Id. at 4 (1951) (emphasis original). See Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2104; see also Hunt v. Roth,
648 F.2d 1148, 1165 (8th Cir. 1981) (denial of bail to persons charged with certain sexual offenses
violates the eighth amendment), vacated as moot on other grounds sub nom. Murphy v. Hunt, 455
U.S. 478 (1982) (per curiam); United States ex reL Goodman v. Kehl, 456 F.2d 863, 868 (2d Cir.
1972) ("no constitutional distinction between requiring excessive bail and denying bail altogether in
the absence of legitimate reasons"); Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483, 485-88 (D.D.C. 1960)
(juveniles held in house of detention pending civil cases were denied their constitutional right to
bail).
55. 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (5-4 decision; decided in the same term as Stack). The Court in Carlson held that the United States Attorney General could detain without bail alien communists involved in deportation proceedings under the Internal Security Act of 1950:
The Eighth Amendment has not prevented Congress from defining the classes of cases in
which bail shall be allowed in this country.... Indeed, the very language of the Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable. We think, clearly, here that the Eighth
Amendment does not require that bail be allowed under the circumstances of these cases.
Id. at 545-46.
56. See, eg., United States ex rel. Covington v. Coparo, 297 F. Supp. 203, 205-06 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
57. See United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1326 n.6 (D.C. 1981) (en banc), cert denied,
455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
58. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534, 537 (1979).
59. See Carbo v. United States, 82 S.Ct. 662, 667-69, applicationdenied, 369 U.S. 868 (1962);
United States v. Gilbert, 425 F.2d 490, 491-92 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Blunt v. United States, 322 A.2d
579, 584 (D.C. 1974).
60. See Comment, supra note 52, at 200.
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tion. 61 Second, potentially dangerous resident aliens can be detained pending
deportation proceedings. 62 Third, defendants who present a danger to the public and who lack the capacity to take care of themselves, such as juveniles and
63
the mentally ill, can be detained.

In this third category, the Supreme Court decision in Schall v. Martin64 is a

particularly important forerunner to Salerno.65 In Schall the Court held that a

New York statute6 6 authorizing pretrial detention of an accused juvenile based
on a finding that she might commit a crime before her return date did not violate
defendant's right to due process. 67 The analysis in Schall is similar to that found
in Salerno. The Court in Schall determined that the State had a "legitimate and
compelling" interest, which could be furthered by pretrial detention in protecting the community from crime. 68 As long as the detention served this purpose,

the Court found the detention was regulatory rather than punitive. 69 In addition, the Schall opinion found "nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct" that would result in the detention being held
unconstitutional. 70 The Court in Salerno mentioned each of these points and
71
cited Schall as precedent.

In addition to the eighth amendment arguments against the denial of bail, a
defendant can argue that detention is proper only if it does not violate his right
to due process protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments. In Snyder v.
61. See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (approving unreviewable executive power to
detain enemy aliens in time of war); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1909) (rejecting due
process claim of individual jailed by state governor in time of insurrection).
62. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537-42 (1952) (alien communists can be detained
without bail pending deportation pursuant to the Internal Security Act of 1950); Wong Wing v.
United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (alien Chinese can be detained without bail pending
deportation).
63. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264-74 (1984) (allowing statutory pretrial detention of
juveniles who present a continuing danger to the community); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,
426 (1979) (state has the power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of the
mentally ill); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731 (1972) (mentally incompetent criminal defendant can be detained indefinitely only if he is dangerous); Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366,
375 (1956) (upholding detention before trial of mental incompetent who, if released, "would probably endanger the officers, property, or other interests of the United States").
64. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
65. For a more detailed discussion of the significance of Schall, see Alschuler, supra note 50, at
527-32, and Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generationof Bail Reform, 76 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1, 39-41 (1985). Schall was a six-to-three decision, with Justice Rehnquist writing
the opinion and Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens dissenting. This division was identical to
that of the Court in Salerno. United States Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina, in arguing against
the constitutionality of pretrial detention, feared that Schall would serve as precedent for a case such
as Salerno. See Ervin, PreventiveDetention, A Species of Lydford Law, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 113,
122 n.61 (1983) ("[T]he Schall decision, stands as an ominous portent for the future.").
66. N.Y. FAM. Cr. AcT § 320.5(3)(b) (McKinney 1983).
67. Schall, 467 U.S. at 256-57.
68. Id. at 264 (citing De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155 (1960)).
69. Id. at 269-74.
70. Id. at 278-79 (quoted in Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2103).
71. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2102-03 (State's interest in preventing crime (citing Schall, 467 U.S.
at 264-65)); id. at 2101 (detention is regulatory rather than punitive (citing Schall, 467 U.S. at 269));
id. at 2103 (" 'nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct'"
(quoting Schall, 467 U.S. at 278)).
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Massachusetts72 the Supreme Court referred to due process as a "principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental."'73 As recognized in Salerno, due process prevents the government from engaging in conduct that "'shocks the conscience' -74 or "interferes
with rights 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' -75 Additionally, before a
court can deprive an individual of a constitutionally protected interest, it must
examine certain factors to determine if the procedure violates the person's right
to due process:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that76the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
In considering pretrial detention, the Supreme Court has defined certain
parameters of the accused's right of due process. In Gerstein v. Pugh77 the
Court held that a judicial determination of probable cause was a prerequisite to
any detention beyond that needed for the administrative steps incident to
arrest. 7 8 In addition, an individual cannot be detained before his trial if the
detention constitutes punishment. 79 As the Court stated in Bell v. Wolfish,80
"[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law." 8 1
In Bell, however, the Court also concluded that government detention of a
defendant before trial does not necessarily constitute punishment.8 2 Given this
holding, the key issue becomes whether a particular government action is a per83
missible regulatory restraint or punishment. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
the Court described the criteria to determine whether a governmental act punitive in nature:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
72. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
73. Id. at 105.
74. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2101 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).

75. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
76. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
77. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
78. Id. at 114-15. The Gerstein Court defined probable cause "in terms of facts and circumstances 'sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was
committing an offense.'" Id. at 111-12 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)).
79. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36 (1979) (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 67172 n.40, 674 (1977)); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165-67, 186 (1963); Wong Wing

v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896)).
80. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
81. Id. at 535.
82. Id. at 536-37.
83. 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (examining whether the automatic forfeiture of citizenship provisions
of the immigration laws amounted to punishment).
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promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and
84
may often point in differing directions.
If pretrial detention is punishment according to the criteria listed in MendozaMartinez, then it violates the defendant's right to due process.
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 was not the first pretrial preventive detention
law passed by Congress. In 1970, at the urging of President Richard Nixon and
Attorney General John Mitchell, Congress enacted the District of Columbia
Court Reform and Criminal Procedures Act of 1970,85 which contained provisions authorizing pretrial detention in the District of Columbia if the defendant
was deemed to be dangerous to the community.8 6 The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals held that the pretrial detention statute was not unconstitutional on its face.8 7 The United States Supreme Court, however, avoided deciding the issue at that time by refusing to grant certiorari.8 8
In 1984, Congress enacted the Bail Reform Act, which allowed a magistrate, within statutory guidelines, to detain a criminal defendant before his trial
if a judicial officer finds that "no condition or combination of conditions [of
release] will reasonably assure.., the safety of any other person and the community." 8 9 The legislative intent behind the Act was summarized in the Senate
Judiciary Committee report:
[T]he Committee concluded that.., there is a small but identifiable
group of particularly dangerous defendants as to whom neither the imposition of stringent release conditions nor the prospect of revocation
of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or other
persons. It is with respect to this limited group of offenders that the
courts must be given the power to deny release pending trial. 90
84. Id. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted) (quoted in Bell, 441 U.S. at 537-38).
85. District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedures Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91358, 84 Stat. 473, 642 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1321 to -1332 (1981 & Supp.
1987)). This legislation was authored in part by Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was then Assistant
Attorney General overseeing the Office of Legal Counsel. See Alschuler, supra note 50, at 512 n.3.
At the same time, a similar bill was introduced, supported by the Nixon Administration, authorizing
pretrial preventive detention throughout the federal courts. S. 2600, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115
CONG. REc. 19,256 (1969); H.R. 12,806, 91st Cong., IstSess., 115 CONG. REC. 19,352 (1969).
Both the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, chaired by Senator Ervin, and the Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee refused to report the bill for further consideration. See
Ervin, supra note 65, at 115-16.
86. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1321(b), 1322(a)(1), (b)(2), (e) (1981 & Supp. 1987). The authors
of the Federal Bail Reform Act borrowed a number of the procedural provisions in these statutes.
See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1983).
87. United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022
(1982); see Comment, supra note 52. After a thorough survey of the history of the eighth amendment, and upon reaching the conclusion that there was no constitutional right to bail, the Edwards
court's analysis of defendant's due process claims was very similar to that used by the Supreme
Court in Schall and Salerno. See Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1331-37.
88. Edwards, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. 1985).
90. S.REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1983).
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The attorney for the Government can move to have the defendant detained in
any case involving (1) "a crime of violence"; (2) "an offense for which the maxi-

mum sentence is life imprisonment or death"; (3) drug-related offenses punishable by imprisonment of ten years or more; or (4) any felony committed after the

defendant had already been convicted of two or more offenses falling in any of
the above categories. 91 If the Government moves to have the defendant detained, a detention hearing will be held before a judicial officer. 92 At the hearing
the defendant has the right to be represented by counsel, to testify, to present
witnesses on his own behalf, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present any

other information by proffer or otherwise. 93 If the judicial officer decides to
detain the defendant, she must issue a written statement that includes the findings of fact and the reasons for her decision. 94 If possible, the defendant should
95
be incarcerated separately from convicted prisoners.

The controversies in Salerno originated in a detention order issued pursuant
to these statutes. Salerno is the first case in which the Supreme Court has explic-

itly held that the eighth amendment does not ensure a defendant's right to
97
bail. 96 This holding settles the conflict between the dicta in Stack and Carlson,

and resolves an ambiguity that has existed in the excessive bail clause since its
inception. 9 8 The majority in Salerno correctly observed that "[tihis Clause, of

course, says nothing about whether bail shall be available at all." 99 Therefore,

without any clear expression of the intent of the framers, the Court chose a

literal, restrictive interpretation of the excessive bail clause and held that it applied only to the judiciary. According to the Court's reasoning, the excessive

bail clause protects only against the government's proposed conditions of release
91. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1) (Supp. 1985). The statute provides a rebuttable presumption that
the defendant should be detained if he has been convicted of committing any of these offenses while
free on bail within the past five years. Id. § 3142(e). There is also a rebuttable presumption that any
defendant in a case involving offenses in the third category, or an offense involving the possession of
a firearm during the commission of a felony, should be detained. Id.
92. Id. § 3142(f). The hearing must be held at the defendant's first appearance, unless a continuance is granted. A continuance sought by the defendant may not exceed five days, and a continuance sought by the Government may not exceed three days. Id.
93. Id. In the presentation and consideration of information at the hearing, the formal rules of
evidence do not apply. Id. In determining whether the defendant should be detained, the judicial
officer should consider (1) "the nature and circumstances of the offense charged"; (2) "the weight of
the evidence against the [defendant]"; (3) "the history and characteristics of the [defendant]"; and
(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger the defendant's release would pose to any person or the
community. Id. § 3142(g).
94. Id. § 3142(i)(1). The facts the judicial officer uses to support her decision that the defendant poses a threat to the community must be supported by "clear and convincing evidence." Id.
§ 3142(f).
95. Id. § 3142(i)(2).
96. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2104-05.
97. In Salerno, the Supreme Court discounted the value of the dicta in Stack by noting that the
primary issue in Stack was whether bail was excessive if set at a sum greater than that necessary to
ensure the defendant's presence at trial. Id. at 2104. In contrast, the Salerno Court found that
Carlson was "remarkably similar to the present action" and affirmed Carlson's holding that the
eighth amendment does not restrict Congress from denying bail in noncapital cases for reasons other
than to prevent flight. Id. at 2105.
98. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
99. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2104.
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Because the

"conditions of release or detention" in individual cases are set only by judicial
officials, the bail clause, in effect, restricts only judicial discretion.'10
As explained in Marshall's dissent, from the perspective of the defendant it
makes little difference whether he has been denied bail by a legislative act or by a
judge who sets the amount of bail at an amount higher than the defendant can
pay. 10 2 In either case, he will be detained before his trial. However, the Court's
analysis of this issue and its subsequent holding did not favor the defendant's

perspective. The Salerno decision was not based on what rights the eighth
amendment ensures for the defendant, but rather was based on what limitations
the Constitution places on the government.' 0 3 From this perspective, the Court
found that the excessive bail clause does not restrict the power of the legislature.

This focus on the governmental interest also serves as the foundation for
the Salerno opinion's distinction between the punitive and regulatory nature of
detention." °4 Referring to the criteria for punishment in Mendoza-Martinez,10 5
the Salerno Court stated that the distinction turns on "'whether an alternative

purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for
it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose as-

signed [to it].' "106 However, the Court in Salerno made no mention of the other
Mendoza-Martinez considerations that view the restriction from alternative
perspectives. 107
100. Id. at 2105.
101. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "[W]e need not decide today whether the Excessive Bail Clause speaks at all to Congress' power to define the classes of criminal arrestees who shall
be admitted to bail," id., the Court's interpretation of the clause precludes its application to restrict
legislative power.
102. Id. at 2108 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
103. See id. at 2104. The Court noted, "Nothing in the text of the Bail Clause limits permissible
government considerations solely to questions of flight. The only arguable substantive limitation of
the Bail Clause is that the government's proposed conditions of release or detention not be 'excessive'
in light of the perceived evil." Id. at 2105 (emphasis added). Cf Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1368 (Mack,
J., dissenting) (arguing for a constitutional right to bail, Judge Mack stated, "I would opt for the
interpretation [of the excessive bail clause] that not only makes common sense but that is the very
essence of the Bill of Rights--the preservation of individual liberty.").
104. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
105. See supra text accompanying note 84.
106. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2101 (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984)). In his
dissent in Bell, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's application of the Mendoza-Martinez
standard, and suggested that one distinction between punishment and a regulatory sanction is that
punishment is "backward-looking, personal, and normative," but a regulatory sanction is "forward
looking, general, and nonnormative." Bell, 441 U.S. at 581-82 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Under
this analysis, pretrial detention is appropriate to ensure the detainee's presence at trial and to protect
the safety of witnesses and jurors. Id. (cited in Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1332 n.29). Pretrial detention
would not, however, be appropriate in light of the "personal" and "backward-looking" factors considered by the judicial officer at a defendant's detention hearing. See supra note 93.
107. The other factors not addressed by the Salerno Court include whether the detention involves an affirmative restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as punishment, whether it
comes into play on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment-retribution and deterrence, and whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime. See supra text accompanying note 84. If the Salerno Court had considered these other criteria, the punitive nature of pretrial detention would have been apparent. Whether before trial or after
conviction, incarceration certainly involves an affirmative restraint, see infra text accompanying
notes 109-15, and so has historically been regarded as punishment. The purpose of the detention, as

1988]

PRETRIAL DETENTION

When viewed in terms of the impact and the extent to which a defendant's
rights are restricted, pretrial detention is virtually indistinguishable from punishment. 10 8 The Court has recognized incarceration as an "'infamous punishment.' "109 The detention not only deprives the defendant of his liberty, but it
often disrupts his relationships with his family and friends, results in loss of
employment, tarnishes his reputation, and hampers his ability to prepare for his
defense. 10° Furthermore, the Court in Bell held that prison officials may con-

fine a detainee with another inmate in a room built for only one;III may prohibit
him from receiving food and other personal items from outside the institu-

tion;'1 2 may require him to remain outside his room during "shakedown" inspections;113 and may conduct body cavity searches following visits with friends

and family. 114 The Salerno Court did not consider these aspects of a person's
detention in its decision to label the detention "regulatory.

' 115

Another important variable that determines the severity of the detention is
the length of time between the detainee's arrest and his trial. The Salerno Court

stated that "the maximum length of pretrial detention is limited by the stringent
time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act." 1 16 However, as legal maneuvering
becomes more sophisticated and discovery more elaborate in complex trials,
these time limitations have proved to be less than stringent. In reality, detention

periods can last over a year.

17

The District of Columbia pretrial detention stat-

advocated by its proponents, is specifically to deter defendants from committing further crimes. In
addition, a court ordering pretrial detention must find that the defendant's behavior constituted at
least probable cause that she committed a crime, see supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text, and
in almost all detention hearings the State is likely to offer evidence of scienter. As recognized by the
Supreme Court in Mendoza-Martinez, the determination of whether governmental acts are punitive
or regulatory in character is "extremely difficult and elusive." Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168.
However, considered in light of all of these factors, pretrial detention appears to be punitive.
108. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 569 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As explained by Senator Sam Ervin,
To claim [that a pretrial detainee] is not subject to punishment defies plain truth and is
irreconcilable with the rules governing the interpretation of constitutional and statutory
provisions. Courts are obligated to interpret such provisions to mean what they say and
are not permitted to distort that meaning to achieve desired results.
Ervin, supra note 65, at 123.
109. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (quoting Wong Wing v. United States, 163
U.S. 228, 237 (1896)).
110. See R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM 41-43 (1965); Alschuler, supra note 50, at 517; Ervin, supra
note 65, at 122-23.
111. Bell, 441 U.S. at 541-43.
112. Id. at 553-55.
113. Id. at 555-57.
114. Id. at 558-60.
115. In the 1980s political leaders have reexamined and debated the proper role of government
in regulating various aspects of American society. In this context, it is perhaps ironic that in the
same term that the Court reaffirmed the regulatory authority to deprive an individual's liberties in
the context of pretrial detention, it also limited the government's regulatory power to restrict property rights. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 107 S.Ct. 2378
(1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987).
116. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2101; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982 & Supp. 1985). The Speedy
Trial Act provides that the trial of an incarcerated defendant must begin within 90 days of his
detention. Id. § 3164(b). This maximum limit, however, can be (and often is) extended under appropriate circumstances.
117. See Alschuler, supra note 50, at 515-17 & nn.27-30; see also Bridges, The Speedy TrialAct
of 1974: Effects on Delays in FederalCriminalLitigation, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 50, 69
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ute' 18 contains a sixty-day maximum limit with a possible thirty-day extension, 119 but the Bail Reform Act does not specifically set any limit on how long a
defendant can be detained. Although the Court in Salerno recognized that an
"excessively prolonged" detention would be punitive, it gave no guidance as to
the length of such a period of time. 120
In determining the "'principle[s] of justice ... rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people,' ",121 the Salerno Court expended more energy on balancing current policy interests than on considering the history and development
of individual liberties of the accused before trial. In Bell the Court had acknowledged that " '[t]he principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.' "122 Yet,
without citing any authority, the Bell Court concluded that a presumption of
innocence "has no application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has even begun." 123 Based on this
unsupported statement, the due process inquiry in Salerno shifted from whether
the detention violated a fundamental principle of justice to whether it was punishment or a regulatory restraint.
By redirecting its analysis, the Salerno Court ignored the legal tradition
noted by the dissent. From 1789 to 1984, federal courts recognized and protected a general right to bail as established by the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
if not by the eighth amendment. 124 Justice Jackson emphasized the importance
of this tradition in 1950 in reviewing an application for bail pending appeal:
[I]t is... difficult to reconcile with traditional American law the jailing of persons by the courts because of anticipated but as yet uncommitted cimes.... Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but
unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in this country and so
fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that I am loathe to resort
to it .... 12 5
Under this tradition recognizing a defendant's right to bail, every person is entitled to his liberty until after he abuses it and has been convicted of that abuse
26
through due process of law.'
Addressing the argument that the procedures of the Bail Reform Act violated the due process rights of Salerno and Cafaro, the Court stated that " 'there
is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal con(1982) (chart illustrating that despite the Speedy Trial Act, approximately 10% of all federal crimi-

nal cases required more than 360 days of "processing time").
118. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
119. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(d)(2)(A), (d)(4) (1981 & Supp. 1987).
120. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2101 n.4.
121. Id. at 2103 (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105).
122. Bell, 441 U.S. at 533 (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).
123. Id.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 51-56.
125. Williamson v. United States, 95 L. Ed. 1379, 1382 (Jackson, Circuit Justice 1950) (footnote
omitted).
126. See U.S. CONST. amend V; supra note 29.
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duct' ,,;127 thus, it is presumed, a defendant can be detained on the basis of that
prediction. However, in every case before Schall in which the Court relied on a
prediction of future conduct to make a decision affecting a person's liberty, the
affected person had already been convicted of a crime. 128 Moreove, no consensus exists within the legal or psychiatric professions concerning the predictability of future violent or dangerous behavior. 129 Perhaps because of these
uncertainties, the Salerno Court noted that the statutes require the Government
to prove "by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified
and articulable threat to an individual or the community. '1 30 These procedural
safeguards in the Bail Reform Act131 and the regulatory nature of the detention
are the two linchpins to the Court's holding that the pretrial detention does not
violate defendants' due process rights.
When Alice passed through the looking glass to the other side, she entered
a world of unexpected adventures and unknown dangers. 132 Similar dangers

may await the Supreme Court after Salerno. The most significant aspects of the
Salerno decision are, first, a very literal interpretation of the eighth amendment
that focused on the limitation of government power rather than the protection of
individual liberty, 13 3 and, second, the deftness with which a defendant's right to
due process was reduced to a punitive/regulatory balancing act. 134 There are
already signs that pretrial detention is not being used as the legislature and

courts had anticipated it would be. The "small but identifiable group of particu-

larly dangerous defendants" 135 numbered 2,853 during the first sixteen months
that detention without bond had been available and, according to another count,
4,178 during only the first five months of 1985.136
127. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2103 (quoting Schall, 467 U.S. at 278).
128. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979)
(grant of parole); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (death sentence); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation). This observation was made by Justice Marshall in Schall. 467
U.S. at 294-95 n.20 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

129. Compare J. MONAHAN,

PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL

TECHNIQUES 27 (1981) (the best predictions are no better than one-third accurate) with Kozol,
Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 CRIME & DELINQ. 371,
389-92 (1972) (dangerousness can be reliably diagnosed in most cases).
130. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2103 (emphasis added).
131. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
132. See supra text accompanying note 1.
133. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text. This type of reasoning and the unknown
dangers to which it can lead were anticipated by the Supreme Court over a century ago:
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated
by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half
their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound
than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the
citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta
principiis.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37, 108-15.
135. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1983); see supra text accompanying note 90.
136. The first figure was supplied by the Justice Department, and the second figure was supplied
by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. See Alschuler, supranote 50, at 515. The
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The greatest problem with Salerno is that it gives local magistrates tremendous power, but with little guidance and little provision for deterrence against
abuses. 137 For example, the Bail Reform Act allows detention of persons accused of "crimes of violence." 138 But such crimes can include any offense that
has as an element "the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person or property of another," 13 9 which would include, theoreti-

cally, misdemeanor assault or shoplifting. 14° By holding that pretrial detention
is constitutional, Salerno gives judicial officers the discretion to impose severe
limitations on a defendant's liberty after only an unproven accusation. It is possible that such a detention statute could be misused to persecute and incarcerate
an individual or group because of their race or their political beliefs. 141 In light
of these dangers, Justice Marshall concluded:

[W]e must pay substantial social costs as a result of our commitment
to the values we espouse. But at the end of the day the presumption of

innocence protects the innocent; the shortcuts we take with those
whom we believe to be guilty injure only those wrongfully accused
and, ultimately, ourselves. 142
As we peer, like Alice, through the looking glass in search of answers to our
nation's crime problem, we may be tempted to detain the first person we see who
might be considered dangerous. However, looking in that mirror, we should not
be surprised if we see only ourselves.
M.,GRAY STYERS, JR.

United States Marshals Service claimed the Bail Reform Act had been "'primarily responsible for a
32 percent increase in prisoner population... during the first year after its passage.' "Id. (quoting
Riley, Preventive Detention Use Grows-But Is It Fair?,Nat'l L.J., Mar. 24, 1986, at 1, 32).
137. As Justice Marshall wrote in dissent in Schall, the Court's holding that a pretrial detention
statute was not unconstitutional on its face "would almost certainly preclude a finding that detention
of [an individual] pursuant to the statute violated any clearly established constitutional rights; in the
absence of such a finding all state officials would be immune from liability in damages.... ." Schall,
467 U.S. at 299 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A) (Supp. 1985).
139. See id.§ 3156(a)(4).
140. See Alschuler, supra note 50, at 512-13 & n.7; see also Ervin, supra note 65, at 124 (under
the statute, judicial officer may "order preventive detention for individuals who might commit petty
larceny or other trivial offenses if the officer personally deems these crimes inimical to the safety of
others in the community").
141. One commentator has observed that at the same time the Supreme Court was handing
down the landmark due process decisions of the 1930s, European dictators were using "the institutions of criminal justice as instrumentalities for the systematic destruction of political values upon
which free societies rest." Allen, The Judicial Quest for PenalJustice" The Warren Court and the
Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.J. 518, 522. It is also worth noting that some of the most often
quoted right-to-bail cases-Carlson,Stack, and Williamson-involved either the arrest or deportation of persons with unpopular political views.
142. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2112 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

